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This paper studies the cointegration and the bivariate causality relationship between exchange 
rates and stock prices on the seven Asian countries badly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis. Our 
empirical results show that, before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, all countries, except the 
Philippines and Malaysia, experience no evidence of Granger causality between the exchange 
rates and the stock prices. However, the causality but not the cointegration between the capital 
and financial markets appear to become strong during the Asian Financial Crisis period. 
Surprisingly, after the 911-terrorist-attack, the causality relationship between the two markets 
returns to normal as in the pre-Asian-crisis period and the cointegration relationship weakens 
between exchange rates and stock prices. Thus, we conclude that (1) Asian Financial Crisis has a 
bigger and more direct impact on the causality relationship between stock prices and currency 
exchanges in Asian markets and the 911-terrorist-attack basically has no impact on the causality 
relationship between the two markets; and (2) the financial and capital markets have become more 
mature and efficient after the crisis. 
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BIVARIATE CAUSALITY BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATES AND STOCK PRICES ON MAJOR 
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
High exchange rate and stock price fluctuations during the crisis are popular topics in the financial 
press and among academicians. We still can recall when financial crisis sparked in Thailand in July 
1997, Asian countries started to experience a series of financial downfalls. For instance, the Hang 
Seng Index lost more than 1400 points in October 1997 as a result of big jump of short-term 
interest rate in Hong Kong in order to maintain its exchange rate against US dollar. Korean Won 
also dropped dramatically for about 56% against US dollar in December 1997 as compared to its 
value in January 1997. This currency crisis in South Korea caused further financial turmoil on its 
stock markets, with a downfall of over 50%. 
 
 The devaluation of Thai Baht in July 1997 ignited a financial avalanche in other Southeast Asian 
currencies. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines experienced the most severe foreign exchange 
pressures in the end of 1997. In late October, the scale of the crisis had dampened the regional 
economy significantly as the pressure from depreciation of New Taiwan dollar spread to Hong 
Kong and Korea currencies. This financial storm continued to deteriorate Asian economy and did 
not slow down until the first quarter of 1998. This is known as the period of Asian Financial Crisis 
which is also called Asian flu. 
 
When Asian countries are working hard to find medicines to cure the Asian flu, unfortunately in 
2001, the world’s economic super power, US was hit by terrorist attack. This may have big impact 
on Asian economy and delay the recovery from the Asian crisis in 2001 further. As we can recall, 
back on September 11, 2001, global financial markets went into tailspin in reaction to what has 
generally been described as a severe blow on the US. For example, in late afternoon trading, 
Nikkei 225 Average was down 6.5%, Hang Seng Index was down 9.5%, the Korea Composite 
Price Index was down 10.3%, Malaysia’s KLSE lost 11.8%, Thailand Stock Exchange was also 
down 18% and Taiwan Price Weighted plummeted to about 15.38%. In contrast to the significant 
plunges in stock markets, currencies in major Asian markets were not affected by the terrorist 
attack on US.  
 
After observing how severe economy conditions in Asian countries was during the Asian Financial 
Crisis and the 911-terrorist-attack, we are motivated to find  out if stock market crash cause the 
exchange rate depreciation or currency depreciation leads to stock price downfall and whether the 
  2Asian Financial Crisis and the 911-terrorist-attack will alter this relationship. In fact, the relationship 
between exchange rates and stock prices can be seen as a reciprocal causal effect. This means 
that the fluctuation in exchange rates can substantially affect the value of the firm, which in the end 
will have impact on stock prices. This is called the traditional approach (Frenkel and Rodriguez 
1975, Boyer 1977). On the other hand, the movement of the stock market will cause capital 
movements in a particular country resulting exchange rate fluctuation. This phenomenon is also 
known as portfolio approach.
i The majority of preceding studies support the traditional approach. 
Only a few indicate the existence of portfolio approach or the feedback relationship between the 
two markets.  
 
This paper analyzes in detail the dynamic relationship between stock prices and exchange rates by 
employing both the cointegration and bivariate causality techniques on the seven Asian countries 
badly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Korea, 
Philippines, and Thailand. Japan is included in our study for control purpose. We analyze the 
relationship for the pre- and post-Asian Financial Crisis periods as well as pre- and post-911-
terrorist-attack as to study the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis and the 911-terrorist-attack on 
the relationship. If this relation can be ascertained, practitioners can profit from the arbitrage 
especially during a severe financial crisis. 
 
Our empirical results show that, in the period before Asian Financial Crisis, all countries except the 
Philippines and Malaysia, experience no evidence of Granger causality between the exchange 
rates and the stock prices. However, the causality but not the cointegration between the capital 
and financial markets appear to become strong during the Asian Financial Crisis period. In this 
period, all countries show evidence of causality between the two markets. Surprisingly, after the 
911-terrorist-attack, the causality relationship between the two markets return to normal as in the 
pre-crisis period, where all countries, except Korea, are found to have no linkages between 
exchange rates and stock prices. In addition, we find that there is no specific cointegration 
relationship between the exchange rates and the stock prices before or during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis but after the 911-terrorist-attack, there are weaker cointegration relationships 
between exchange rates and stock prices. Thus, we conclude that (1) the Asian Financial Crisis 
has bigger and more direct impact on the causality relationship between stock prices and currency 
exchanges in Asian markets; the 911-terrorist-attack basically has no impact on the causality 
relationship between the two markets and (2) the financial and capital markets has become more 
mature and efficient after the crisis. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature while Section 3 
describes about data; Section 4 discusses the methodologies by employing both cointegration and 
  3causality techniques; Section 5 elaborates upon our empirical results and Section 6 discuss the 
possible reasoning for the cointegration and causality relationship for each country. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2.   Literature Review 
The effect of exchange rates on stock market volatility has received much attention lately, 
especially after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As reported by Kamin (1999), Mishkin (1999) and 
Kwack (2000), the major causes of Asian Financial Crisis were the devaluation of local currencies, 
the short-term external debts and high interest rates and financial imbalances. In retrospect of the 
literature, there are quite a number of studies that attempted to determine the impact on stock 
prices and exchange rates changes. The findings, however, are not uniform across the various 
studies.  
 
Many literatures have supported the phenomenon of traditional approach that exchange rates’ 
fluctuation lead to stock prices movement. According to Dornbursh and Fisher (1980), changes in 
exchange rates affect firm’s earning and hence impact its stock price. This study also explains that 
the reciprocal causal effect between exchange rates and stock prices depends on whether the firm 
is dealing with exporting or importing business. Aggarwal (1981) argued that a change in exchange 
rates could change stock prices of multinational firms directly and the domestic firms indirectly. 
Bodart and Reding (1999) showed that an increase in exchange rates volatility is accompanied by 
a decline in international correlation between bonds and to a lesser extent, the stock market. 
Kearney (1998) found that exchange rates volatility is a more significant determinant for volatility of 
stock prices rather than interest rates volatility. Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2000) discussed the 
stock prices and exchange rates dynamics and found that the US stock market acts as a conduit 
through which the foreign exchange market and local stock market were linked. In addition, Pan et 
al. (2000) studied seven Asian emerging markets and concluded that in general, exchange rates 
Granger-cause stock prices. They also found that countries which have a higher trade to GDP 
ratio, exchange rate fluctuations tend to exhibit significant influence on the equity market, 
regardless of the exchange rate arrangement system and the degree of capital control.  
 
Conversely, it has been argued that the demand for money equation, which is derived from the 
monetary portfolio allocation model, which makes it possible to make stock prices affect the 
exchange rates. Gavin (1989) suggested that movements in stock prices may influence exchange 
rates, and money demand could depend on the performance of the stock market. Qiao (1996) also 
agreed that changes in stock prices might affect the inflow and outflow of capital, which would 
result in changes in the currency values. In addition, Ajayi et al. (1998) explained in detail that 
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value of domestic currency.  
 
Although all the above-mentioned theories suggested causal relations between stock prices and 
exchange rates, yet other studies concluded that the exchange rates changes have no significant 
impact on the stock prices (Solnik 1984). Jorion (1990, 1991), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), Amihud 
(1993) and Bartov and Bodnar (1994) failed to find a significant relationship between simultaneous 
dollar movements and stock returns for US firms. Griffin and Stulz (2001) showed that weekly 
exchange rate shocks have a negligible impact on the value of industry indices across the world. 
Using daily data in their study instead of monthly data as used in most prior studies, Chamberlain 
et al. (1997), however, found that the US banking stocks returns are very sensitive to exchange 
rates movements, but not for Japanese banking firms. On a macro level, Ma and Kao (1990) found 
that currency appreciation negatively affected the domestic stock market for an export-dominant 
country and positively affected domestic stock market for an import-dominant country, which is 
consistent with the goods-market theory.  
 
In addition, Qiao (1996) found the stock price-exchange rate causality to be different across 
countries. Specifically, the direction of causation was bi-directional for Japan, was unidirectional 
from the exchange rates to stocks returns for Hong Kong and was non-causal for Singapore. He 
also noted the presence of a strong long-run relationship or cointegration existed in these three 
countries. Using daily data for eight countries, Ajayi and Mougone (1996) showed significant 
interaction between exchange rates and stock prices. Observations based on the emerging 
markets of India, Korea, Pakistan and the Philippines, Abdalla and Murinde (1997) suggested 
unidirectional causality from exchange rates to stock prices in all countries, except for the 
Philippines, where it was stock prices that Granger caused the exchange rates. Moreover, they 
found a long run relationship or cointegration existing in India and Pakistan. Using monthly data 
from July 1973 to December 1988, Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) evaluated the 
interactions between the Standard and Poor’s Composite Index and the effective exchange rate of 
the dollar and found the bi-directional causality between them. However, there was no long run 
relationship or no cointegration between the two variables. 
 
Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) analyzed the impact of 1987 crash on the relationships for six stock 
market indices and found no lead-lag relationships for the period before and after the market crash 
but there are feedback relationships and unidirectional causality during the month of crash. 
Recently, Granger et al. (2000) also suggested that different countries have different relationships 
between exchange rates and stock prices. They found that the Philippines was under portfolio 
approach with negative correlation. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan 
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recognizable pattern.  
 
 
3.   The Data 
The data used are weekly stock market indices and exchange rates from Datastream for eight 
major Asian countries, namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. The sample period runs from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2002, 
which covers a reasonably long period of twelve years in our study. Instead of monthly data as in 
most literatures, weekly data from Wednesday closing index for the emerging markets is used so 
as to have higher power on the results and to capture the effect of capital movement, which is 
intrinsically a short-run occurrence. We abandon the use of daily data to avoid the biases 
associated with non-trading, bid-ask spread and asynchronous prices (Lo and MacKinlay 1988). If 
Wednesday index is missing, then Tuesday price (or Monday if Tuesday’s is missing) is used.  
 
To better analyze the relations between exchange rates and stock prices before and after Asian 
Financial Crisis, we first divide the entire period into two sub-periods and call the first sub-period 
which covered from 1991 to 1996 as pre-crisis period and the sub-period which covered from 1997 
to 2002 as post-crisis period. In the post-crisis period, we further divided our sample into two sub-
periods, pre-911 and post-911 periods, to look into the effect of 911-terrorist-attack: Pre-911 period 
is the period between the Asian Financial Crisis and 911-terrorist-attack (January 1, 1997 – 
September 10, 2001) and post-911 period is the period after the 911-terrorist-attack (September 
11, 2001 - December 31, 2002). We note that some studies use January 1, 1997 to separate the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods while some use July 1, 1997. In this paper, we use both dates to 
separate the pre- and post-crisis. Since similar results were obtained hence we only report the 
results using January 1, 1997 as a cut-off point.
ii We also note that the “Pre-911 period” can be 
treated as the “during-the-crisis period” as we have used different cutting end points before 
September 11, 2001 as the “during-the-crisis period” and the results are similar to that of the “Pre-
911 period”. In this connection, without loss of generality, we also call the “Pre-911 period” as 
“during-the-crisis period” or simply “during the crisis” and the “Post-911 period” is in fact referring to 
the actual “post-crisis period”. 
-------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1  
-------------------------- 
 
Table 1 shows the stock indices and exchange rates for all the countries in our study on different 
sub-periods with their changes respectively. During the pre-crisis period, Indonesia, Korea, and 
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appreciation with modest changes ranging from -20% to 24% while stock markets are basically in a 
bull run with increase ranging from 35% to more than 300% for all countries except Japan and 
Korea. However, all eight economies exhibit pronounced structural breaks during the crisis. All 
currencies suffered noticeable depreciations since January 1997. During the crisis period (January 
1, 1997 – September 10, 2001), Indonesian Rupiah experienced the greatest loss in its value 
(74.01%), followed by Peso of the Philippines (48.73%), Thai Baht (42.58%), Won of South Korea 
(34.58%) and Malaysia Ringgit (33.52%). The rest of the currencies witnessed between 1% to 20% 
depreciation. Similar freefalls in stock prices were witnessed ranging from 17% of the Korea 
market to 60% of the Thailand market. In the post-crisis period, the currencies have appreciated for 
all countries except the Philippines in which the rate of depreciation (4.29%) is much smaller than 
during the crisis. Even though the stock markets remained down in the post-crisis period, the drop 
rates are smaller than during the crisis.    
 
4.   Methodology 
Cointegration tests are important in determining the presence and nature of an equilibrium 
economic relation. To examine the co-movements between stock indices and exchange rates, we 
study the relationship: 
St = α + βEt + ut                                                                      (1) 
 
where St , Et and ut denote the stock index, exchange rate and error term respectively.  
 
The cointegration tests are performed in two steps. The first step is to examine the stationary 
properties of the exchange rates and stock indices series. If a series has a stationary, invertible 
and stochastic ARMA representation after differencing d times, it is said to be integrated of order d, 
and denoted as I(d). It is necessary to first conduct a pre-test of the order of integration for the 
series as a necessary condition for cointegration is that the two series be studied are of the same 
order, usually order one. We apply the Dickey-Fuller (1979, 1981) unit root test procedure to test 
the null hypothesis that Ho: zt = I(1) versus the alternative hypothesis H1: zt = I(0) based on the 
OLS regression: 
 
t t t u z t z + + + = ∇ −1 1 0 0 α α β                            (2) 
or apply the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test based on: 
∑
=
− − + ∇ + + + = ∇
p
i
t i t i t t u z z t z
1
1 1 0 0 β α α β                                      (3)  
where  and z 1 − − = ∇ t t t z z z t can be St or Et as defined in equation (1). 
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The regressions in (2) and (3) allow for a drift term, a deterministic trend and a stochastic 
structure in the error term, ut. The variable p is chosen to achieve white noise residuals. Testing 
the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in zt is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
0 1 = α  in equation (2) and (3). If  1 α  is significantly less than zero, the null hypothesis of a unit root 
is rejected. The test statistic used is the usual t-ratio, but the distribution is not the t-distribution 
under the null hypothesis. When p=0, the test is known as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. This test 
assumes that the residuals, ut, are independently and identically distributed. If serial correlation 
exists in the residuals, then p>0 and the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test must be applied. 
 
In addition, we test the hypothesis that zt is a random walk with drift, i.e. () ( ) 0 , 0 , , , 0 1 0 0 β α α β = . 
The test statistic is the likelihood ratio, 3 Φ , found in Dickey and Fuller (1981). The decision rule is 
to reject the null hypothesis if   is larger than the critical value. We also test for the hypothesis of 
random walk without drift, i.e. 
3 Φ
() ( ) 0 , 0 , 0 , , 1 0 0 = α α β . This test statistic, given by , also causes 
rejection of the hypothesis if it exceeds the critical value. If the hypotheses that 
2 Φ
, 0 1 = α () ( ) 0 , 0 , , , 0 1 0 0 β = )  or ( ( ) 0 , 0 , 0 , , 1 0 0 β α α α α = β  are accepted, then we can conclude that zt 
is an integrated process of order 1. If we fail to reject the hypotheses that zt is I(1), then we test Ho: 
zt = I(2) versus the alternative hypotheses H1: zt = I(1). 
 
If both St and Et are in the same order, the next step is to estimate the cointegrating parameter of 
regression (1) by OLS regression. If the residuals of the regression (1) are stationary, the two 
series are cointegrated. Otherwise, the two series are not cointegrated. 
 
The three most common tests for stationarity of estimated residuals are Cointegrating Regression 
Durbin-Watson (CRDW), Dickey-Fuller (CRDF), and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CRADF) tests. 
Only the more reliable CRDF and CRADF tests








1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ                                     (4) 
where ut are residuals from the cointegrating regression (1) and p is chosen to achieve empirical 
white noise residuals.  The null hypothesis of non-cointegration is rejected if the t-ratio is less than 
the relevant critical value.
iv   
  
After determining cointegration, we test the causality between stock prices and exchange rates 
using the appropriate formulation for Granger causality analysis. This analysis needs to incorporate 
an error correction term into the test if variables are cointegrated (Granger, 1988).  If exchange 
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bivariate autoregression as follows: 
∑∑
==





t t i t i i t i t ECT E S S
11
1 1 1 2 1 0 ε δ α α α                                                                                           
∑∑
==





t t i t i i t i t ECT E S E
11
2 1 2 2 1 0 ε δ β β β                  (5)     
where ΔEt is changes in exchange rate and ΔSt is changes in stock price. ECTt-1, which is St-1 – 
γEt-1, is an error correction term derived from the long run cointegrating relationship in (1). The 
error correction term can be estimated by using the residual from a cointegrating regression. The 
estimates δ1 and δ2 denote the speed of adjustment. According to Engle and Granger (1987), the 
existence of cointegration implies causality among the set of variables as manifested by |δ1| + |δ2| > 
0. Reject (accept) H0: α21 = α22 =  …..= α2m = 0 and δ1 = 0 suggests that exchange rates do (do not) 
Granger cause stock prices. Likewise, reject (accept) H0: β11 = β12 =  …..= β1m = 0 and δ2  = 0 
suggests that stock prices do (do not) Granger cause exchange rates.  
 
If cointegration does not exist, we shall modify (5) without considering error correction term (ECT) 
to be:   
∑∑
==





t i t i i t i t E S S
11
1 2 1 0 ε α α α                                                                                         
∑∑
==





t i t i i t i t S E E
11
2 2 1 0 ε β β β                                                      (6) 
 
Similarly, reject (accept) H0: α21 = α22 =  …..= α2m = 0 suggests that exchange rates do (do not) 
Granger cause stock prices, while reject (accept) H0: β11 = β12 =  …..= β1m = 0 suggests that stock 
prices do (do not) Granger cause exchange rates. These tests lead to no causality, unidirectional 
causality or feedback causality relationship between the stock prices and exchange rates. 
 











F R  
where N is the number of observations, n and m are defined in (5), SSEF, and SSER  are the sum 
of square of residuals for the full regression and the restricted regression respectively in (5). The 
null hypothesis is rejected (accepted) at the α level of significance if F > (<) F(α; m, N-m-n-2). 
Similarly, we can test for :  0 H 0 2 22 21 = = = = m β β β L  and then make decision on the causality 
from S to E. We apply the usual simple t statistics to test for H0: δ1 = 0 and H0: δ2 = 0. 
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paper to determine the optimum lag structures in the regressions (5) and (6), where n and m are 
the maximum lags of the corresponding variables to be used in the right hand side of Equations (5) 
and (6); and  t 1 ε and t 2 ε  are disturbance terms obeying the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression models. The final prediction error statistic of  t S ∇ with n lags of   and m lags of  t S ∇ t E ∇  
is 
        
N m n N
S S m n N
m n FPE
t t
St ) 1 (




∇ − ∇ + + +
= ∑
∇  
where N is the number of observations
v.  The FPE statistic for  t E ∇ is found by the same way. To 
determine the minimum , the first step is to run the regression in first equation (5) excluded 
and only lags of   be included. We start from m=0 and n=1 and calculate . We 
proceed the same step until n=n* where FPE is minimized for m=0. Then, by holding n=n*, we 
systematically lag m until m=m* minimizes the FPE. The same procedure is repeated with the 
second equation (5) where n=n** and m=m** minimize . 
t S FPEΔ
t E ∇ t S ∇ ) 0 , 1 (
t S FPEΔ
) , ( m n FPE
t E Δ
 
5.   Empirical Findings 
We first employ the unit root tests to check for stationarity for the exchange rate and stock index 
series of the eight countries being studied in this paper. The unit root results in Table 2 show that 
there are unit roots in all level series for all periods and for all countries except exchange rates for 
Indonesia and Hong Kong in the pre-crisis period and the exchange rates for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong in the post-911 period.
vi We note that the non-unit root phenomenon for 
Malaysia and Hong Kong in the post-911 period and Hong Kong in the pre-crisis period is due to 
the peg of the currency to US dollar. We also note that in the pre-911 period (between 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and 911-terrorist-attack), Hong Kong dollar still encounter fluctuations and the 
Malaysian Ringgit consists of a non-peg period and hence both exchange rates appear to be I(1).  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
After performing the unit root tests, we then estimate the cointegrating equation in (1) and report 
the results in Table 3. The results show that Thailand is the only country in our study which has the 
cointegration effect of the exchange rate and stock index for all periods. The exchange rate is 
  10cointegrated with stock index in the Philippines and Indonesia for the pre-crisis, post-crisis and pre-
911 periods while the exchange rate is cointegrated with stock index in Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore only in the pre-crisis period. The exchange rate is also cointegrated with stock index in 
Malaysia  and  Korea for the post-crisis period. These findings support most of the previous 
literature that no definitive pattern on cointegration can be identified between the currency and 
stock index not only before the Asian Financial Crisis, but also during the Asian Financial Crisis 
(before the 911-terrorist-attack). However, our results also show that the cointegration between 
exchange rate and the stock index disappear for nearly all countries being studied in this paper
vii 
after the crisis, especially during the post-911-terrorist-attack. Thus, as opposed to the findings in 
most of the previous studies, we claim that the financial and capital markets in Asia have become 
more mature and efficient after the crisis.  
 
We now turn to study the Granger causality relationship between exchange rate and stock index. 
The causality results are reported in Tables 4a to 4d.  
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Similar to the cointegration results, our causality findings before the Asian Financial Crisis are in 
line with most previous literatures (see for example Granger et al. 2000), which show that there is 
no causal relation between stock index and exchange rate for most of the Asian countries including 
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong. Only Malaysia and the Philippines 
are observed to have the causality relationship such that Malaysia appears to have a feedback 
relationship whereas the Philippines shows traditional approach.  
 
However, our empirical results have demonstrated that this phenomenon is not going to continue 
after the crisis. There is strong presence of causal relationship between exchange rates and stock 
prices, especially in the period between the Asian Financial Crisis and the 911-terrorist-attack. 
These anomalies contradict with the previous literature. During the post-crisis period, Hong Kong 
and the Philippines followed the portfolio approach, which is stock prices lead currency rates, 
whereas Singapore is described to have a strong relationship in unidirectional causality particularly 
in agreement with the traditional approach. The rest of the countries in this period follow bi-
directional relationship, which is currency rates lead stock prices and vice versa. 
 
Our findings of the causality anomalies may be due to the fact that both exchange rates and stock 
prices fluctuate dramatically during the Asian Financial Crisis as our post-crisis period covers both 
“during the crisis” and “after the crisis”. If this is true, the causality will eventually disappear after 
  11the crisis. Also, we question whether the 911-terrorist-attack has the same impact on the financial 
and capital markets. In this connection, we further study the behavior of relationship between 
exchange rates and stock prices by dividing the post-crisis period into two periods: pre-911 period 




Our findings show that in the pre-911 period, the relationship between stock prices and exchange 
rates basically exists for all countries in our study such that Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Japan follow the traditional approach; Thailand and Korea experience feedback relationship while 
the Philippines and Hong Kong are observed to have portfolio approach. However in the post-911 
period, we find that the causal relationship between exchange rates and stock prices returns to 
normal such that they vanish in all countries, except for Korea. This shows that the 911-terrorist-
attack does not create any causality relationship in the Asian countries as the Asian Financial 
Crisis; and the causal relationship between exchange rates and stock prices in the post-911 period 
are back to normal as in the pre-crisis period. Based on  all results of our analysis above, 
surprisingly the Asian Financial Crisis period appears to be the only period that the causality 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates exist significantly as compared to other 
periods. 
 
6.   Discussion 
We now focus on the possible reasons for both cointegration and causality relationships for each 
country. We first discuss the relationship for Indonesia. Table 3 shows that its exchange rate and 
stock index are cointegrated with a negative beta during the crisis.
ix This implies that the exchange 
rate and stock index are moving in a different direction during the Asian Financial Crisis. Figures 
1b and 1c confirm this result. In addition, Table 4 shows that the capital and financial markets have 
no Granger causality relationship in both pre-crisis and post-911 periods but the exchange rate 
significantly Granger causes the stock index and the exchange rate marginally Granger causes the 
stock index in the pre-911 period. The possible explanation is that during the crisis, some big 
investors can foresee both the stock prices and the currency will drop continually and short sell 
both instruments while other investors follow too. Both the stock and the currency drop 
continuously for very long period during the crisis. Hence the stock index is falling while the 
exchange rate is rising continuously. Other factors such as political instability, weak law 
enforcements, deteriorated banking system, etc. may contribute to economic turmoil in Indonesia. 
Nasution (2000) argues that negative external shocks, weak fundamentals and incompetent 
management was paralyzed by indecision over adoption of currency board, reduction of large 
state-guaranteed investments and implementation of economic deregulations.  
 
  12On the other hand, the short selling activities reduce after the crisis. Indonesia also tries to restore 
its economy and gradually reduce its dependency on IMF, and its government is not loosening its 
policy on capital control as well as intervention on its currency exchange. These imply that the 
impact on the influence on both markets reduces after the crisis and, hence it is not surprising our 
empirical research shows that there is no relationship between currency exchange and stock price 
movement in the post-911 period. 
 
 Before discussing the relationship on both markets for other Asian countries which are badly hit by 
the Asian Financial Crisis, we herewith first examine Japan which is not badly hit by the crisis. As 
we can observe from Table 3, Japan’s stock price and exchange rate are cointegrated in the pre-
crisis period, but neither in the pre-911 nor the post-911 period. Moreover, Table 4 also shows that 
Japan is the only country in our study where there is no evidence of causal relation between the 
foreign exchange and equity market in both periods before and after the Asian Financial Crisis.
x 
This is consistent with previous studies (He and Ng 1998, Chamberlain et al. 1997). It is well 
known that Japan practices free floating exchange rate system together with no restriction in 
capital control. According to Pan et al. (2000), for a country that does not employ a freely floating 
exchange rate system, its exchange rates might not fully respond to stock prices movement. 
Similarly, capital control might reduce dynamic linkages between foreign exchange and equity 
prices. Another major possible reason is that there is no significant speculation activities occurs in 
Japan. These factors strengthen our argument that there is no integration on Japan’s currency and 
stock prices as shown in Figure 7b.  
 
For Malaysia, we notice that this is the only country that has feedback causality relationship 
between the capital market and stock market before the Asian Financial Crisis and the exchange 
rate strongly Granger causes stock index in the pre-911 period but not the post-911 period. This is 
because the Malaysian Government imposes capital control to anticipate speculation on its 
financial market. This sudden change of government policies costs Malaysia to missed out from 
most of the international capital that returned to the region in the beginning of quarter four 1998. 
During the pre-911 period, we observe from Table 4c that exchange rate Granger causes stock 
index. However, after the 911-terrorist-attack, there is no evidence of causal relation between 
exchange rate and stock price. This lack of significant relationship between the two markets may 
be result of intense government intervention on capital market after Asian Financial Crisis. 
Furthermore, our result in Table 3 also shows that cointegration between Malaysian Ringgit and 
KLCI exist only during post-crisis period. This finding is consistent with Ibrahim (2000).
xi  
 
Although Singapore is an open city state economy and does not impose any capital control, its 
economy depends largely on trading and investment activities with neighboring countries, mainly 
  13Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as US and Europe. Singapore currency is pegged with a ‘basket’ 
of currencies; this means its currency is weighted in terms of the importance of the countries 
concerning Singapore’s trade. The movements in short- and medium-term Singapore exchange 
rates are dominated by capital market adjustments in different currencies. If foreign portfolio 
holders expect the real return on Singapore financial assets to increase, they will buy Singapore 
dollar to buy asset and thereby increase the demand of Singapore dollar. This is true during the 
pre-911 period, as shown in Table 4c, Singapore dollar leads Singapore stock index. But this 
phenomenon does not last long. During the period of post-911, the Singapore economy has 
worsened. This is because of significant decrease in Foreign Direct Investment to Singapore. 
When faced with the bitter pill of capital outflows, Singapore maintained the managed floating 
exchange rate policy. As a result, we fail to observe any relationship between exchange rate and 
stock price after 911-terrorist-attack (Figure 6d). The lack of relationship between Singapore dollar 
and stock price can be attributed to Singapore’s small, highly open economy, with low inflation 
relative to the rest of the world. Singapore government basically controls its currency exchange 
rate, which is pegged against “a basket of currency”, in orders to serve the purpose of its economy 
and does not allow future market speculation activities on its currency. These policies are set to 
safeguard the danger of the capital market crash, especially while the stock market plummeted  
during the crisis due to poor international sentiment. Hence, the capital market and stock market 
are not cointegrated nor have any causal relationship during the crisis like other Asian countries. 
 
We observe from Table 4a that the Philippines follows traditional approach in pre-crisis period. 
However, during the pre-911 period, the relationship turns out to follow portfolio approach. The 
reasons could be during the crisis,  the Philippines  faces the same situation as other Asian 
economies, massive capital outflow causes the stock exchange to experience a great blow of 
67.87% which led the Peso to slide 50.93% during the crisis period (see Table 1). Moreover, trade 
deficit and inefficient banking system meant that the  central bank was unable to maintain it’s a 
strong currency value in the market. During the post-911 period, no evidence of causal relationship 
is found. Figure 2d confirms this analysis by showing significant change of the stock price 
movement and exchange rate fluctuation as compared to Figures 2a, 2b and 2c. As expected, the 
Philippines government also imposes capital control and tightens its currency policy in order to 
prevent further capital outflow and maintain economic stability. That is why we find that 
cointegration between exchange rate and stock price for the Philippines exist only up to the pre-
911 period (see Table 3). 
 
Korea is observed to possess long term strong relationship between stock price and exchange rate 
in both pre-911 and post-911 periods. Moreover, Korea is also the only country to be observed to 
have stock price Granger causeing exchange rate in the post-911 period (Table 4d). Our analysis 
  14is consistent with Min (1999). Korea controlled financial market tightly in early and late 1980s 
(Reisen and Yeches, 1991; Park, 1996). This is in line with our study that there is no linkage 
between exchange rate and stock price during the pre-crisis period. Evidence from Figure 5a 
clearly shows the Korean Won has a stagnant movement and is not fluctuating as much as the 
stock index does. However, in 1999 Korea fully implemented the reform plan for capital 
liberalization. As a result, the volume of international capital flow increase, particularly portfolio 
investment. Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) had been fluctuated and increased in 1996 but 
the amount was not significant compared to portfolio investment liabilities. This deregulation by 
Korean government strengthens our analysis about feedback relationship between exchange rate 
and stock price during the post-crisis period (see Table 4). Capital liberalization leads movement in 
capital market and demand for Korean Won. During post-911 period, the feedback relationship 
between the two markets still exists. This is due to the capital flight that drags down stock price and 
currency depreciation simultaneously.  
 
Thailand, like other developing countries, has not fully implemented an  open equity market to 
foreigners and is also reluctant to adopt a completely free floating foreign exchange system. 
However, interestingly, Thailand is the only country in our study that has long term strong 
relationship between stock price and exchange rate in all periods (Table 3). This implies that the 
past information of exchange rate can be used to predict the stock price and vice versa. Since 
Asian Financial Crisis was first triggered in Thailand, Thai government has taken much concern 
about its economy and watched over its capital in- and out-flows. Although the government allowed 
the Thai Bath to float on July 2, 1997, we find feedback relationship during the crisis. But, this 
situation did not last long. During post-911 period, there is no relationship between stock price and 
exchange rate, back to the situation as pre-crisis.  
 
In the pre-crisis period, Hong Kong experienced no interaction between stock index and exchange 
rate (see Tables 2 to 4). Even though Hong Kong dollar is pegged against US dollar and only 
depreciated 0.82% during the crisis period (see Table 1), Hong Kong has portfolio approach 
relationship during the crisis. But, we again find no causality relationship between the two markets 
in the post-911 period. As Hong Kong is also considered to be one of the highly open economies 
with no capital control, our results basically show that Hong Kong’s exchange rate and stock price 
has no interaction with each other. This is mainly because its currency is pegged against US dollar. 
For long term, Hong Kong is speculated to have no relationship between its currency and stock 
index. Our empirical results show that there is no evidence of cointegration between the two 
markets in the post-crisis period (Table 3).
xii
 
  15In general, we find in our study that the relationship between exchange rate and stock prices 
become more intense during the Asian Financial Crisis as compared to pre-crisis period. However, 
the phenomenon in the post-911 is somewhat reminiscent of the pre-crisis period. This implies that 
the Asian Financial Crisis has a more significant and direct impact on relationship between 
currency exchanges and stock prices in Asian markets and the 911-terrorist-attack basically has no 
effect on these markets. During Asian Financial Crisis, there are strong factors that caused 
economic collapse in major Asian countries. Woo (2000) elaborated factors such as: investor 
panic, tightening macroeconomic policies and improper handling of the insolvent banks in 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand have been accused to cause a mess in major Asian economies. 
Besides, Wong et al. (2003) found that strong tendency of co-movement after Asian Financial 
Crisis between emerging markets in Asia has also contributed to regional financial woes. This 
statement is also in agreement with the notion contagion effects (or tequila effects) which means 
exchange rate crisis in one country that contaminates other countries with proximity and/or similar 
level of economic development with economic structure. In particular, we notice that this effect can 
be more detrimental to the economy if improper co-ordination occurs in the remedy of the crisis. 
Inappropriate government policies during the turmoil will also contribute panic in the market and 
lead to sharp withdrawal of funds in a country or a region. The economy will deteriorate further if 
political stability in that particular country follows. Min (1999) called this phenomenon the 
coordination failure effects. 
 
The cause of Asian Financial Crisis was also highlighted by Krugman (1998a, 1998b). The crisis 
also causes many firms to bankruptcy and this magnified vulnerability of financial sector and at the 
end, decreases investor confidence. On the other hand, the 911-terrorist-attack is viewed to have 
indirect impact from US economy. Further tightening of capital control and government intervention 
in financial market has led us to conclude that there is no linkage between stock prices and 
currency exchanges at least for short period of time in near future. 
 
7.   Conclusion 
Prior studies based on monthly data have found either little relation can be established between 
the two markets or exchange rate leads stock price. In this paper, we apply weekly data to analyze 
the problem in the Asian economies. The result indicates that during the pre-crisis and post-911 
periods, markets in general are largely characterized by the phenomenon predicted under no 
relationship between stock prices and currency exchanges or at least no special patterns in the 
cointegration and causality relationships. However, all markets exhibit significant evidence of either 
change in exchange rates leads that in stock prices or either market can take the lead (feedback or 
bilateral causality) during the Asian Financial Crisis period. This specific phenomenon during the 
crisis is mainly due to investor panic, tightening macroeconomic policies and improper handling of 
  16the insolvent banks. The notion of contagion effect also cannot be downplayed. This financial 
tsunami in 1997 that cause the collapse of stock prices and currency values in major East Asia 
countries are believed to be contaminated by Thailand and Korea. 
 
We also find interesting evidences in our study that the relationship between stock prices and 
currency rates in post-911 period has somewhat returned  to the situation during pre-crisis period., 
We believe this is because major Asian governments have reverted to their policies to tighten 
capital movement as compared to early 1990s when barriers to capital movement are gradually 
removed. Most Asian countries have experienced capital outflow during the crisis and imposed 
regulation that prevent further capital flight in order to restore their economy. Capital movement in 
and out of the Asian economies is as beneficial as it is detrimental. The Asian Financial Crisis 
certainly has put the stock and the currency markets in a spotlight that suggests financial markets 
in the Asian economies need an overhaul. 
 
Last but not least, our empirical research also finds that cointegration or long term relationship 
between exchange rates and stock prices in Asian market weakened during the post-911 period. 
This leads to the conclusion that the stock markets in this region have become more efficient after 
the 911 event.  
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Table 1: Comparison of Exchange Rates and Stock Indices between Sub-periods 
 
Panel A: Exchange Rate 










I to II  II to III  III to IV 
Hong Kong  7.7983  7.7345  7.7998 7.7987 0.82% -0.84% 0.01%
Indonesia 1889.0000  2362.2500  9090.0000 8950.0000 -20.03% -74.01% 1.56%
Japan   135.8000  115.8500  119.8200 118.7750 17.22% -3.31% 0.88%
Korea 714.5000  844.5498  1291.0000 1185.7000 -15.40% -34.58% 8.88%
Malaysia 2.6983  2.5264  3.8000 3.8000 6.80% -33.52% 0.00%
Philippines 27.2000  26.3000  51.3000 53.6000 3.42% -48.73% -4.29%
Singapore 1.7355  1.3995  1.7502 1.7364 24.01% -20.04% 0.79%
Thailand 25.3000  25.7000  44.7600 43.1050 -1.56% -42.58% 3.84%




Panel B: Stock Indices 










I to II  II to III  III to IV 
Hong Kong  3024.55  13451.45  10417.36 9321.29 344.74% -22.56% -10.52%
Indonesia 417.79  637.43  445.48 424.95 52.57% -30.11% -4.61%
Japan   23848.71  19361.35  10292.95 8578.95 -18.82% -46.84% -16.65%
Korea 696.11  651.22  540.57 627.55 -6.45% -16.99% 16.09%
Malaysia 505.92  1237.96  690.54 646.32 144.69% -44.22% -6.40%
Philippines 651.42  3170.00  1294.09 1018.41 386.63% -59.18% -21.30%
Singapore 947.49  1991.68  1566.76 1341.03 110.21% -21.33% -14.41%
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Table 2a: Unit Root Test Results of Stock Indices and Exchange Rates for the Pre-crisis and Post-crisis periods 
 
Country Variable  Period DF  ADF  Φ2 Φ3
Pre-crisis -2.39  -2.45  2.61  4.44 
Index 
Post-crisis -2.06  -2.67  0.52  2.21 
Pre-crisis -5.15** -5.15**  12.18**  13.80** 
Indonesia 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -1.97  -1.86  0.59  2.94 
Pre-crisis -2.54  -2.54  3.54  4.61 
Index 
Post-crisis -2.30  -2.85  1.44  2.68 
Pre-crisis -2.39  -2.08  0.24  3.00 
Philippines 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.17  -2.36  2.06  3.05 
Pre-crisis -0.60  -0.60  2.09  2.33 
Index 
Post-crisis -2.49  -2.70  2.47  4.08 
Pre-crisis -2.35  -2.35  0.11  2.80 
Thailand 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.22  -2.22  1.06  3.61 
Pre-crisis -2.14  -2.14  1.41  2.34 
Index 
Post-crisis -2.16  -2.40  1.60  2.81 
Pre-crisis -1.76  -2.31  0.46  1.64 
Malaysia 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.12  -2.25  0.72  3.68 
Pre-crisis -1.02  -1.02  0.22  0.82 
Index 
Post-crisis -1.80  -1.86  0.35  1.64 
Pre-crisis -1.94  -1.56  1.19  1.91 
Korea 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.12  -2.78  0.65  3.04 
Pre-crisis -2.08  -2.08  1.94  2.70 
Index 
Post-crisis -1.46  -1.52  0.22  1.07 
Pre-crisis -2.13  -2.13  2.94  2.29 
Singapore 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.27  -2.27  2.49  4.16 
Pre-crisis -2.14  -2.14  0.33  2.46 
Index 
Post-crisis -1.69  -1.69  1.26  1.75 
Pre-crisis -0.49  -0.49  1.35  1.20 
Japan 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -1.97  -1.97  0.01  1.94 
Pre-crisis -2.41  -2.41  3.52  3.25 
Index 
Post-crisis -1.54  -1.70  0.13  1.24 
Pre-crisis -4.54** -3.94*  0.41  10.60** 
Hong Kong 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-crisis -2.35  -1.50  1.01  2.88 
 
 
  23Table 2b: Unit Root Test Results of Stock Indices and Exchange Rates for the Pre-911 and Post-911 periods 
 
Country Variable  Period  DF  ADF  Φ2 Φ3
Pre-911 -1.80 -2.31 0.53  1.69 
Index 
Post-911 -1.01 -1.01  0.20  0.52 
Pre-911 -1.71 -1.71 0.50  2.18 
Indonesia 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -3.72* -3.72*  0.51  8.37* 
Pre-911 -2.07 -2.48 1.18  2.19 
Index 
Post-911 -0.89 -0.89  0.33  0.60 
Pre-911 -1.99 -2.16 1.80  2.28 
Philippines 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -1.32 -1.32  0.70  1.12 
Pre-911 -2.19 -2.39 2.28  3.20 
Index 
Post-911 -1.43 -1.43  0.68  1.03 
Pre-911 -1.94 -1.94 0.93  2.53 
Thailand 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -1.32 -1.32  0.56  1.09 
Pre-911  -1.85  -2.07    1.84  2.36   
Index 
Post-911 -0.95 -0.95  0.07  0.65 
Pre-911 -1.73 -1.75 1.27  2.69 
Malaysia 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -7.71**  -7.71**  0.00 29.70** 
Pre-911 -1.46 -1.39 0.22  1.07 
Index 
Post-911 -1.78 -1.78  0.53  4.03 
Pre-911 -1.88 -2.47 0.49  2.18 
Korea 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -1.70 -1.70  0.43  1.63 
Pre-911 -1.49 -1.76 0.32  1.14 
Index 
Post-911 -1.15 -1.15  0.33  1.71 
Pre-911 -2.25 -2.25 4.04  3.51 
Singapore 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -3.48* -3.48*  0.02  9.19** 
Pre-911 -1.28 -1.28 1.05  1.20 
Index 
Post-911 -1.99 -1.99  0.37  2.99 
Pre-911 -1.88 -1.88 0.04  1.77 
Japan 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -1.77 -1.77  0.18  2.34 
Pre-911 -1.47 -1.47 0.06  1.11 
Index 
Post-911 -2.51 -2.51  0.32  4.37 
Pre-911 -2.71 -2.28 0.96  3.69 
Hong Kong 
Exchange 
Rate  Post-911 -7.19**  -7.19**  0.02 25.85** 
DF is the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic; ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
Φ2 and Φ3 are the Dickey-Fuller likelihood ratios. 
*denotes p<0.05, ** denotes p<0.01.  
Note that pre-crisis period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1996, post-crisis period is from  
January 1,1997 to December 31, 2002 which are further divided into two periods: pre-911 period  
(January 1, 1997 – September 10, 2001) and post-911 period (September 11, 2001 - December 31, 2002). 
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Country  Period  Model     R
2 CRDF CRADF 
Pre-crisis St = -20.1874 + 3.4208Et 0.5799 -2.59** -2.40* 
Post-crisis St = 8.7484 - 0.2894Et 0.4082 -2.48* -3.29** 
Pre-911 St = 8.6567 - 0.2781Et 0.4038 -2.23* -2.94** 
Indonesia 
Post-911 St = 12.2458 - 0.6745Et 0.1131 -1.01  -1.01 
Pre-crisis St = 5.6181 + 0.5973Et 0.0030 -2.64** -2.64** 
Post-crisis St = 12.5169 - 1.3594Et 0.8154 -2.48* -2.48* 
Pre-911 St = 11.8550 - 1.1727Et 0.7719 -2.57* -2.57* 
Philippines 
Post-911 St = 23.5179 - 4.1716Et 0.4532 -1.85  -1.85 
Pre-crisis St = 53.2934 - 14.353Et 0.2915 -3.02** -3.02** 
Post-crisis St = 10.8307 - 1.3318Et 0.5634 -2.74** -2.74** 
Pre-911 St = 10.9307 - 1.3619Et 0.5617 -2.42* -2.42* 
Thailand 
Post-911 St = 21.2058 - 4.0761Et 0.5688 -2.21* -2.21* 
Pre-crisis St = 10.5247 - 4.0209Et 0.2492 -1.21  -1.21 
Post-crisis St = 8.2663 - 1.3257Et 0.4549 -2.11* -2.00* 
Pre-911 St = 8.2937 - 1.3558Et 0.4702 -1.86  -1.86 
Malaysia 
Post-911 St = 66.8047 - 45.1453Et 0.0047 -1.14  -1.14 
Pre-crisis St = -2.8455 + 1.4247Et 0.0759 -1.19  -1.19 
Post-crisis St = 12.3519 - 0.8343Et 0.1783 -1.90 -2.51* 
Pre-911 St = 13.2676 - 0.9701Et 0.2561 -1.76 -2.34* 
Korea 
Post-911 St = 6.6588 - 0.0143Et 0.0000 -2.44* -2.44* 
Pre-crisis St = 8.4249 - 2.4866Et 0.6934 -2.20* -2.20* 
Post-crisis St = 7.7586 - 0.6376Et 0.0411 -1.40  -1.34 
Pre-911 St = 7.7026 - 0.5022Et 0.0214 -1.30  -1.44 
Singapore 
Post-911 St = 5.7190 + 2.7685Et 0.2914 -1.64  -1.64 
Pre-crisis St = 7.6016 + 0.4858Et 0.2317 -2.36* -2.36* 
Post-crisis St = 14.8736 - 1.1043Et 0.1316 -0.63  -0.63 
Pre-911 St = 12.3303 - 0.5526Et 0.0999 -0.74  -0.74 
Japan 
Post-911 St = 4.6967 + 0.9377Et 0.1581 -1.24  -1.24 
Pre-crisis St = 256.3082 - 0.5041  -3.25**  -2.53* 
Post-crisis St = -19.4329 + 14.0636Et 0.0464 -1.56  -1.56 
Pre-911 St = -72.1517 + 39.8107Et 0.3100 -1.74  -1.74 
Hong Kong 
Post-911 St = 41.7576 - 15.8235Et 0.0005 -1.61  -1.61 
 
CRDF is the cointegration regression Dickey-Fuller statistic for stationary of the estimated residuals. 
CRADF is the comparable test statistic for the augmented Dickey-Fuller.   
*denotes p<0.05, ** denotes p<0.01. 
Note that pre-crisis period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1996, post-crisis period is from January 
1, 1997 to December 31, 2002 which is further divided into two periods: pre-911 period (January 1, 1997 – 







  25Table 4a: Granger Causality Results of Weekly Stock Indices 
 and Exchange Rates in the Pre-crisis period 
 
Country  Granger 
Cause  n m p-values 
a p-values 
b
Indonesia Ex  Æ Ix  2  1  0.5095  0.2835 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  1  0.4940  0.3846 
Philippines Ex  Æ Ix  1  3  0.0771  0.0060** 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.2762  0.7375 
Thailand Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.5069  0.0741 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  6  0.0889  0.6671 
Malaysia Ex  Æ Ix  1  2  <.0001**  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  6  0.0362*  n.a. 
Korea Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.6110  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  6  2  0.0726  n.a. 
Singapore Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.5346  0.2323 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  3  0.1240  0.4461 
Japan Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.2056  0.8223 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  1  0.2487  0.0616 
Hong Kong  Ex Æ Ix  2  3  0.2325  0.1208 




Table 4b: Granger Causality Results of Weekly Stock Indices 





n m p-values 
a p-values 
b
Indonesia Ex  Æ Ix  3  2  0.0015**  0.0480* 
 Ix  Æ Ex  6  1  0.0215*  0.1182 
Philippines Ex  Æ Ix  4  1  0.4378  0.1650 
 Ix  Æ Ex  5  6  0.0131*  0.0779 
Thailand Ex  Æ Ix  4  3  0.0542  0.0122* 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  6  0.0117*  0.0746 
Malaysia Ex  Æ Ix  5  2  0.0066**  0.0475* 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  1  0.3680  0.0185* 
Korea Ex  Æ Ix  6  5  0.0480*  0.0601 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  1  0.0006**  0.3539 
Singapore Ex  Æ Ix  5  1  <.0001**  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  1  0.6719  n.a. 
Japan Ex  Æ Ix  1  2  0.0630  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.2387  n.a. 
Hong Kong  Ex Æ Ix  4  1  0.2008  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  6  3  0.0011**  n.a. 
 
  26Table 4c: Granger Causality Results of Weekly Stock Indices 




n m p-values 
a p-values 
b
Indonesia Ex  Æ Ix  3  2  0.0018**  0.0555 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.0583  0.1879 
Philippines Ex  Æ Ix  4  1  0.4888  0.0814 
 Ix  Æ Ex  5  5  0.0360*  0.2122 
Thailand Ex  Æ Ix  5  3  0.0634  0.0466* 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  3  0.0333*  0.0947 
Malaysia Ex  Æ Ix  3  2  0.0213*  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  1  0.4039  n.a. 
Korea Ex  Æ Ix  5  6  0.0275*  0.0905 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  1  0.0043**  0.4773 
Singapore Ex  Æ Ix  5  3  <.0001**  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.7880  n.a. 
Japan Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.0291*  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.3347  n.a. 
Hong Kong  Ex Æ Ix  4  1  0.2484  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  6  3  0.0012**  n.a. 
 
Table 4d: Granger Causality Results of Weekly Stock Indices 




n m p-values 
a p-values 
b
Indonesia Ex  Æ Ix  3  1  0.9275  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  1  0.9705  n.a. 
Philippines Ex  Æ Ix  6  1  0.8730  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.5722  n.a. 
Thailand Ex  Æ Ix  1  1  0.5524  0.0724 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.1332  0.9263 
Malaysia Ex  Æ Ix  2  5  0.1731  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  4  1  0.5345  n.a. 
Korea Ex  Æ Ix  2  1  0.4607  0.0006** 
 Ix  Æ Ex  2  4  0.0442*  0.9926 
Singapore Ex  Æ Ix  3  1  0.1372  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  4  1  0.2962  n.a. 
Japan Ex  Æ Ix  5  3  0.0730  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  1  1  0.2082  n.a. 
Hong Kong  Ex Æ Ix  3  1  0.0562  n.a. 
 Ix  Æ Ex  3  2  0.0879  n.a. 
Æ Implies Granger cause, e.g. Ex Æ Ix implies exchange rate Granger causes stock index. 
a) p-values of F test on H0: α21 = α22 =  …..= α2m = 0 or H0: β11 = β12 =  …..= β1m = 0 
b) p-values of t test on H0: δ1 = 0 or H0: δ2 = 0 in ECM model. 
*denotes p<0.05, ** denotes p<0.01. 
Note that pre-crisis period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1996, post-crisis period is from January 
1,1997 to December 31, 2002 which are further divided into two periods: pre-911 period (January 1, 1997 – 
September 10, 2001) and post-911 period (September 11, 2001 - December 31, 2002). 
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Figure 3: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Thailand 
 
































































































































































































Figure 4: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Malaysia 
 
































































































































































































Figure 5: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Korea 
 
































































































































































































Figure 6: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Singapore 
 


































































































































































































Figure 7: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Japan 
 




























































































































































































Figure 8: Time Series Plot of Exchange Rate and Stock Index in Hong Kong 
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NOTES 
                                                  
t E t S ∇
i For an intuitive explanation of the portfolio approach, see Krueger (1983, pp.81-91). Other related works 
include, Frenkel and Rodriguez (1975) and Boyer (1977). 
ii The results of using July, 1 as cut-off point are available on request.  
iii Engle and Granger (1987) suggest that the CRDW test might be used to obtain a quick approximate result.  
The power of the CRDW test is greater than the DF type tests for the case where the alternative hypothesis 
is a simple stationary first-order autoregressive process but is sensitive to the dynamic structure of the error 
term.  Thus CRDW test is not a reliable test for cointegration. 
 
iv Engle and Granger have tabulated these critical values for the case where p=0 (CRDF) and for p>0 
(CRADF) for the bivariate regression with a sample of 100 observations while Engle and Yoo (1987) have 
provided critical values for samples varying from 50 to 200 observations. One may refer to Manzur et al. 
(1999) for more detail in the cointegration modeling. 
v The conditions that∇ and  are stationary is necessary for the validity of the statistic.  
vi We tested for I(1) versus I(2) for all series and conclude that all series are I(1). The results are available on 
request.  
vii All countries except Thailand and Korea both have marginally cointegration relationship at the 10% level.  
viii Refer to section 3. 
ix The results show that exchange rate and stock index are also cointegrated in the pre-crisis period but this results 
cannot be used as exchange rate is I(0) while Index is I(1) in this period (Table 2). 
x Table 3 shows that there is marginal causality from Exchange Rate to Stock Index during the crisis but no 
causality after the crisis period.  
xi Refer to Ibrahim (2000) for details explanation. 
xii Table 3 shows that the financial market and capital market in Hong Kong are cointegrated in the pre-crisis 
period but this results cannot be used as Table 2 shows that Exchange Rate is I(0) while Stock Index is I(1).  
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